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Abstract—Securing the supply chain of information and
communications technology (ICT) has recently emerged as a
critical concern for national security and integrity. With the
proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their
increasing role in controlling real world infrastructure, there
is a need to analyze risks in networked systems beyond estab-
lished security analyses. Existing methods in literature typically
leverage attack and fault trees to analyze malicious activity
and its impact. In this paper, we develop RIoTS, a security risk
assessment framework borrowing from system reliability theory
to incorporate the supply chain. We also analyze the impact of
grouping within suppliers that may pose hidden risks to the
systems from malicious supply chain actors. The results show
that the proposed analysis is able to reveal hidden threats posed
to the IoT ecosystem from potential supplier collusion.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Supply Chain, Attack Tree,
Birnbaum importance, Improvement potential.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring the integrity of the supply chain for ICT equip-
ment is becoming an important concern as components are
often manufactured, owned, and operated by different entities
across the globe [1]. With the emergence and rapid adoption
of IoT technologies in infrastructure systems, these concerns
are surging as cyber-physical attacks are becoming more
complex and may involve international entities. Supply chain
threats pose a striking set of new challenges for the security
of IoT systems [2]. In broad terms, supply chain security
requires a shift of focus from vulnerability management to
robust system modeling. This modeling is the foundation
of RIoTS. Existing cybersecurity threat assessment tools
such as attack trees are useful starting points to model the
threats against IoT systems; however, these tools must be
adapted to consider the wider class of potential threats that
arise from suppliers. Attack trees are typically constructed
from empirical observations of how attackers exploit existing
vulnerabilities in a system. By contrast, a supply chain attack
is not limited to the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities.
Rather, because a supplier might modify any component with
very few restrictions, the attack surface of a supply chain
threat is coextensive with the entire system. Supply chain
threats are therefore a particularly robust type of ‘unknown
unknown’. This qualitatively different type of attack requires
risk analysis that uses deep knowledge of the system at each
layer of complexity.
A. Related Works
Security risk modeling techniques and those that use di-
rected acyclic graphs provide necessary background [3], [4].
The attack tree method, developed by Schneier and Amoroso,
extends from earlier fault tree analysis [5], [6]. Significant
developments have been made in the construction and use
Fig. 1: Supplier role in threat assessment. By providing
specifications along with components, supplier trust impacts
accuracy of attack trees.
of attack graphs, including the incorporation of defensive
measures, aggregation and probabilistic modeling [7]–[11].
The use of automated attack tree generation at scale is
similarly a topic of recent study [4], [12], [13]. A more formal
analysis of attack trees has also been developed in [14], [15].
On the other hand, reliability analysis has been investigated in
detail in the literature, [16], [17] with Baiardi et al. studying
hierarchical, hypergraph based modeling of systemic security
risks [18]. Standard definitions of supply chain terminology
and discussion of associated risk management practices for
ICT systems are found in the report from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [19].
B. Contributions
A necessary precursor to risk management is the ability
to analyze and quantify risk. Traditional methods of risk
analysis do not take into account the supply chain layer
of the problem. This paper is aimed at developing the
foundations for analyzing supplier oriented risks by bridging
the gap between established reliability analysis and attack
tree security risk assessment techniques. By modeling system
hierarchy it is possible to discover supplier involvement and
assess hidden risks. We find that this holistic, system level
analysis of security risk is essential to approaching supply
chain risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides an overview of the essential components used for
risk analysis, Section III provides the risk analysis metrics,
Section IV presents a case study to evaluate the proposed
analysis, and Section V concludes the paper with providing
some insights into future work.
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II. BACKGROUND
We consider a network of electronic components as an
archetype of IoT devices. In this section, we provide an
overview of the ingredients that are essential for risk analysis
in the IoT system. Supply chain risk modeling comprises
three areas of concern, each of which can be modeled
as a network: attack steps, supply chains, and component
relationships. Understanding supply chain risk involves not
only using established techniques of vulnerability assessment,
but also a thorough understanding of the social, political and
economic context of business interrelationships that are the
external reflection of the internal technical structure of the
system.
A. Attack Tree
Attack trees are a graph-based approach to model a set of
attack steps with varying logical relations. Originally devel-
oped as a variant of fault trees, attack trees are distinguished
from fault trees by focusing on security related faults caused
by the malicious and intentional activity of some attack
agent. A second significant feature of attack trees is that the
fault in question may be the disruption or negation of any
number of security attributes of the system, a different set of
concerns than functionality. Conventionally these attributes
are confidentiality, availability, and integrity.
Attack trees are organized around a goal, which is the
root node of the tree. Child nodes are subgoals that stand
in some logical relationship to their parent. Some nodes
are and nodes, in which case they require all of their
children as preconditions. Other nodes are or nodes, such
that each of the children represent differing ways to satisfy
the node’s preconditions. Nodes in an attack tree typically
are assigned probability values, making the attack tree a
Bayesian network. Given a well developed attack tree and
associated probabilities, the likelihood that the attack goal
will be reached can be computed. Attack trees often are
annotated with other values, such as the impact or cost of an
attack step succeeding, the skill level required to accomplish
the attack step, or time constraints. While many attack trees
are manually constructed by experts in order to conduct a
formal risk analysis, in other cases the construction of attack
trees can be automated.
B. Supplier Network
Supply chain risk analysis must ask questions about the
relevance of manufacturing across diverse jurisdictions and
regulatory regimes. Likewise, concerns about supply chain
are recursive, since the chief risk arising from a supplier
might be from its own suppliers. In general, these concerns
can be abstracted into a trust value, discussed in greater depth
in the following subsection. Additionally, difficult questions
must be posed about the effect on risk of suppliers being
associated by various forms of business relationship, includ-
ing ownership, investment, partnership, merger or acquisition.
In general, these questions will be considered by grouping
together certain suppliers under their ‘owners’, although this
term is not meant to limit the relationships under considera-
tion to full ownership. Perhaps the most challenging aspect
of supply chain security involves the dynamic nature of the
supplier network, since a change in the topology of the
supplier network may impact the resulting risk in significant
ways.
The network of suppliers involved in a system may extend
beyond those that immediately produce a component. For in-
stance, a company may own several suppliers as subsidiaries,
requiring that the owner be considered as a potential risk to
systems that include components manufactured by these sub-
sidiaries. Additionally, as described in the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework for supply
chain risk management, risk may arise from all entities
involved in the entire life-cycle of the system: from design
and manufacturing, to transportation, retail, maintenance and
even disposal. All of these entities will become part of the
risk model.
C. System Graph
The network of suppliers involved in a system reflects the
composition of the system from subsystems and components.
Although it is common to consider subsystems as ‘black
boxes’ whose internal composition is less relevant than the
functions and interfaces exposed by the subsystem, con-
sideration of supplier-induced risk requires examining each
layer of complexity. Apparently innocuous components from
untrustworthy suppliers may pose significant risks. Generally,
a component can be considered either as a component or
as a system in its own right. By recursively decomposing a
system’s components, a more complex network is generated
that more fully represents the composition of the system.
This sort of decomposition is necessary in order to discover
the suppliers involved in a system. As a generalization, each
component in a system has a supplier that provides the
component to the company that produces the system. As
a product becomes incorporated into a larger system, its
systemic risk is affected by the suppliers involved in the
product’s life-cycle.
Fig. 2: System graph depicting component nodes Ca provided
by suppliers Sa.
Composing the supplier network together with a graph
of component dependencies produces a unified view of the
system from the perspective of supply chain security. The
resulting graph will be called a system graph. Consulting
relevant attack trees for each component yields probability
values that will be essential for systemic risk evaluation. In
this way, the risk information contained in an attack tree can
be transferred into a graph of the system where components
are central rather than attack steps. This shift in focus is
essential in order to consider the relationship of suppliers to
attack steps.
The following definitions are given to specify the nature
of a system graph, with an example shown in Fig. 2:
• System Graph, represented by SG = (C, S,E, n, u),
where C and S are sets of components and suppliers, re-
spectively, and the set of edges is E ⊆ (C∪S)×(C∪S).
A component implements a particular set of functions,
which is denoted as cf . Note that a subset of these
functions will be relevant to security. A special node
is denoted as n /∈ C that identifies the entire system
as a whole. This node is useful when traversing various
levels of complexity.
• Decomposition function, represented by d maps a com-
ponent that is a system to the components out of which
the system is composed. Every component in a system
can be decomposed into its proper components unless
the component is atomic. The function d is defined as:
∀ci ∈ Cm,
{
d(ci) = Ci, =⇒ ci = n ∈ SGi
d(ci) = {∅}
• Component that is also a system is the product of a
composition process conducted by some entity, denoted
as u /∈ S. The entity conducting the composition process
of one system is also the entity that is the supplier when
the system is considered as a component. The relation
between layers of complexity in a system is defined as
follows:
∀ci ∈ Cm, ci, si = n, u ∈ SGi, =⇒ 〈si, ci〉 ∈ SGm
• Edges e ∈ C × C indicate functional dependencies,
where an edge 〈b, c〉 signifies that c cannot perform its
function unless b is adequately performing its function.
In other words, the inputs of function set cf are the
outputs of function set bf . Where these functions are
relevant to security, these edges encode various ways to
attack each component.
D. Attack Probabilities and Supplier Trust
In a system graph as defined above, the risk of any
component node being attacked successfully can be assessed
with a well-developed attack tree rooted at the component.
The intuition to provide similar probability values for supplier
nodes requires development. The value should indicate the
perceived or assessed trustworthiness of the entity; i.e.,
the probability that the supplier will not be malicious or
compromised.
Trust and risk are both values that can be interpreted as
probabilities. The relation between these values is found
in the tacit role that a supplier plays in providing the
product specifications that are the foundation of vulnerability
assessment. While in some cases empirical techniques exist
to discover the functionality of a product, in most cases the
supplier is the primary source of this knowledge. In other
words, the trust value of a supplier should indicate the degree
of belief accorded to the specifications, and therefore to the
resulting attack trees. The supplier does not become a node
in the attack tree; rather, it generally affects the presumed
accuracy of the probabilities in the attack tree.
This definition of supplier trust can be formalized as
follows. Let F be the set of possible functions, and let S and
A be subsets of F , where S is the set of stated specifications
provided by the supplier, and A is the set of specifications
that the component actually implements.
Fig. 3: Supplier trust as defined by specification accuracy
regarding missing and hidden functions.
Fig. 3 illustrates the two possible ways in which the trust
value might be impacted. On the one hand, the actual func-
tionality of the system might include functions not indicated
in the specifications. These can be called ‘hidden’ functions.
Yet it is not sufficient simply to capture trust as the ratio |A||S| ,
which would be the probability that some actual function fa
is in S. It is possible that the specifications may claim a
certain function that is not, in fact, implemented – a ‘missing’
function. To capture this case, we would compute the ratio
|S|
|A| , or the probability that some specified function fs is in
A. To capture both scenarios in one measure, the sample
space is defined as S ∪ A, or the subset of F that pertains
to the system. An accurately reported specification is one for
which fn ∈ S =⇒ fn ∈ A and fn ∈ A =⇒ fn ∈ S, and
is indicated as the set S ∩ A. Therefore the trustworthiness
of a supplier can be measured as the ratio of accurately
reported functional specifications to functions that pertain to
the system, or
Trust =
|S ∩A|
|S ∪A| where S,A ⊂ F
Interpreting the above ratio as a probability value, supplier
trust means the probability that a function pertaining to the
system is an accurately reported function. Supplier trust can
then be taken into account by considering it as an upper-
bound on the accuracy of the attack graphs constructed based
on the supplier-provided specifications. If these graphs result
in an assessed probability p that the system’s security will
be maintained while under threat, but the specifications are
only trusted with trust t, then the system security should
be assessed as the product of p and t. The overall relation
between supplier, specifications, and threat assessment is
shown in Fig. 1.
III. RISK ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss required techniques to analyze
risk in a system graph. We focus on the use of minimal
cutsets to compute system risk and several measures of
component importance.
A. Minimal Cutset Analysis
Given the above definitions, the security risk in a system
may be approached generically as a problem analogous to
system reliability. Before proceeding, it should be noted that
this procedure assumes that the system graph has been pro-
duced that represents a particular attack scenario. Combining
many attack scenarios into a unified system graph is a feasible
but complex application of the analysis presented here. While
assessing probability of attack success in an attack tree might
be conducted by considering the attack tree as a Bayesian
network and calculating prior and posterior probabilities of
component node failures, this procedure cannot be applied
directly to an arbitrary system graph such as described above.
This is due to the fact that in a system graph, there may
be suppliers with multiple edges to various components
such that the risk analysis procedure must take into account
this kind of ‘common cause’ failure. Accordingly, the risk
analysis conducted here will follow the method of distilling
a system graph into a set of minimal cutsets [16].
Each cutset consists of a set of components that, if all are
successfully attacked, the attack as a whole will succeed. This
is analogous to system failure. The cutsets should be minimal,
i.e., if one cutset is a subset of another cutset, the latter is not
minimal and can be excluded because it represents an attack
that includes extraneous steps.
A set of minimal cutsets A is defined so that each cut
a ∈ A is itself a set of steps defined as {yi|yi ∈ C ∪ S},
and each step y has a probability of occurring ry . Note that
a step y may involve either a supplier or component, at any
level of the system. The risk to the system in general can
then be calculated using the probability that all of the steps
have been achieved of at least one of the cutsets. It can be
formally expressed as follows:
R(r) = 1−
∏
a∈A
(
1−
∏
y∈a
ry
)
(1)
B. Component Importance Measures
In reliability theory there are several measures of compo-
nent importance that are useful for risk analysis in a large
system graph. The two that will be discussed here are the
Birnbaum Importance (BI) measure and the Improvement
Potential (IP) measure. Both measures provide insight into
which nodes are significant sources of risk. These insights
might be used to investigate possible causes of security
incidents, calculate cost-effective mitigation strategies, or
assess the security risk of a system during design.
• Improvement Potential: In the context of reliability, IP
of a node represents the potential gain in system relia-
bility that could be achieved by maximal improvement
of the node’s reliability. In the context of risk analysis,
the goal is risk minimization, and so the improvement
potential should be calculated accordingly. Equation
(1) indicates the required structure function needed to
calculate the Improvement Potential measure. Because
the effect on risk of any given node depends not only
on its own risk value but also the risk values of other
nodes in the system, Improvement Potential of a node
must be calculated based on some particular vector of
risk probabilities. Let two vectors be defined to represent
the initial state of the system and the system state after
improving the node in question, as follows:
s0i = {rj |rj ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ 1..N}
s1i = {{ri = 0.0} ∪ {rj = s0j for j ∈ 1..N, j 6= i}}
Then the IP of node i is computed as:
IPi = R(s
1
i )−R(s0i )
The Improvement Potential measure serves as a clear
indicator of which nodes might offer the greatest gain
in minimizing risk. Acknowledging that total mitigation
of all risk is unrealistic, a suitable pragmatic minimal
risk greater than zero might be substituted in the above
s1i vector.
• Birnbaum Importance: The BI measure considers the
sensitivity of system reliability to the reliability of some
component. The measure is therefore a partial derivative
of system reliability, i.e.,
BIi =
∂R(r)
∂ri
Calculation of the BI measure can be conducted using
the system risk function along with two state vectors,
as follows.
s0i = {{ri = 0.0} ∪ {rj |rj ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ 1..N, j 6= i}}
s1i = {{ri = 1.0} ∪ {rj |rj ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ 1..N, j 6= i}}
Then BI measure is computed as:
BIi = R(s
1
i )−R(s0i )
With the measure of system risk and relative component
importance values, it is possible to understand sources of
significant risk in a system. Calculation of these values with
differing supplier trust values will further yield insight into
risks posed by suppliers.
IV. CASE STUDY: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
In this section, we evaluate our proposed RIoTS method-
ology using a case study on a simplified model of an
autonomous vehicle system.
Fig. 4: System graph for a simplified model of autonomous
vehicle comprising of and and or nodes.
The related graph of components and their inter-
dependencies is shown in Fig. 4, with nodes depicted as
and/or logic symbols. Each component has an associated
supplier, denoted with the prefix “s ”. For this simple case
study, all suppliers are independent except the groupings
shown in Fig. 5. These three groupings of suppliers will be
useful to contrast the varying impact of supply chain risk
according to structural importance of the related components.
Fig. 5: Supplier topology for autonomous vehicle system
graph. Each owner controls a small group of suppliers.
This system will be subject to three different sets of risk
values for the nodes. Case 1 provides a baseline scenario,
with risks shown in Fig. 6a. All risk values are below 0.03.
When evaluating the systemic risk according to the methods
described above, the result is 0.05475. This number was cal-
culated by evaluating the probability of the various minimal
cutsets that represent possible failure states, using (1).
Fig. 6b and Fig. 6c depict the Improvement Potentials and
Birnbaum Importances of each node in the system. Several
observations can be made about these measures. First, in
this case, the two measures yield very similar orderings
of system nodes. In our findings, this is not always the
case, and depends on the system graph topology as well as
the similarity between the risk values. Second, it is clear
that the most important nodes by either measure are those
nodes that are themselves minimal cutsets; in other words,
those nodes that are single-points of failure for the system.
This topological feature makes a much greater difference
in importance than risk, as can be seen by comparing, for
example, “s v2i” and “brake act”. The former possesses high
risk but low structural significance, and so ranks relatively
low in importance measures. By contrast, despite having the
lowest risk, “brake act” ranks near the top in importance.
Case 2 begins with the risk values of case 1 but raises
the risk of “o2” to 0.25, as shown in Fig. 7a. The system
risk in this case was 0.28750, significantly higher than Case
1. Fig. 7b and Fig. 7c feature the respective importance
measures. Here again we see similar orderings between the
two measures. However, the Improvement Potential measure
shows more significant divergence between the risky supplier
and the other nodes.
Finally, Case 3 conducts a similar modification of “o1”
to be 0.25, returning “o2” to its initial state. In this case,
system risk is 0.05478, only slightly higher than Case 1,
illustrating again the significance of the topological structure
of the system in the calculation of risk. The importance
measures for Case 3 show that the risky supplier ranks very
low in importance. Once again, despite being a risky supplier
with several dependent suppliers, the risk introduced to the
system is very low compared to other more important nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present RIoTS, a methodology to analyze
risks in networked systems such as the IoT that emanate
from the suppliers of individual components. Due to the
comparatively unconstrained nature of the threat potentially
posed by a malicious or compromised supplier, risk anal-
ysis must shift from a vulnerability-centered approach to
the modeling of suppliers and components as a system.
While attack tree techniques provide a foundation for our
methodology, these techniques must be adapted to include
suppliers and supplier groupings. The inclusion of supplier
trust is grounded in the role played by suppliers in risk
analysis procedures. Borrowing from established methods in
reliability analysis, the use of minimal cutsets and importance
measures provide measures of risk across a system and
its individual components. While such system-level analysis
involves computational complexity, future work will study the
use of heuristics to achieve feasibly optimized risk mitigation.
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